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Abstract
In this paper, we address an unsolved problem in the real world: how to ensure the integrity of the web content in a browser in
the presence of malicious browser extensions? The problem of exposing confidential user credentials to malicious extensions
has been widely understood, which has prompted major banks to deploy two-factor authentication. However, the importance
of the “integrity” of the web content has received little attention. We implement two attacks on real-world online banking
websites and show that ignoring the “integrity” of the web content can fundamentally defeat two-factor solutions. To address
this problem, we propose a cryptographic protocol called DOMtegrity to ensure the end-to-end integrity of the DOM structure
of a web page from delivering at a web server to the rendering of the page in the user’s browser. DOMtegrity is the first solution
that protects DOM integrity without modifying the browser architecture or requiring extra hardware. It works by exploiting
subtle yet important differences between browser extensions and in-line JavaScript code. We show how DOMtegrity prevents
the earlier attacks and a whole range of man-in-the-browser attacks. We conduct extensive experiments on more than 14,000
real-world extensions to evaluate the effectiveness of DOMtegrity.
Keywords Web page integrity · Web Crypto API · Browser extension · WebExtension · Man in the browser · JavaScript ·
DOMtegrity
1 Introduction
Browser extensions have become the dominant method to
extend browser functionality. All major browsers (Chrome,
Firefox, Safari, Opera and Internet Explorer) support exten-
sions, and host dedicated repositories (“stores”) from which
extensions can be downloaded and installed directly from the
Internet. Mozilla reports average rates of more than 1 mil-
lion Firefox extensions downloaded daily and about 100 new
extensions created every day throughout 2017 [18].
Extensions are normally distributed and executed in con-
trolled environments. All extensions uploaded to a repository
are subject to a vetting process, which is a mixture of auto-
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mated program analysis and manual code review aiming
to identify malicious extensions and prevent their spread.
Furthermore, extensions are run in a restricted (so-called
“sandboxed”) environment and only have access to a pre-
defined set of browser APIs.
However, the vetting process is not bullet-proof. A study
conducted by Google researchers found nearly 10% of exten-
sions examined to be malicious [13]. By using obfuscation,
some malicious extensions can slip through the vetting pro-
cess. Furthermore, the extension update mechanism provides
an additional exploit path for the attacker. In 2014, two
popular and previously vetted Chrome extensions, “Add to
Feedly” and “Tweet This Page”, were sold to spammers who
updated the extensions to inject advertisements and affiliate
links into websites opened in the browser.
The problem The key problem with extensions is that,
once installed, they possess over-privileged capabilities that
may be abused by attackers. For example, an extension is
free to modify the Document Object Model (DOM) of a
web page. This allows a malicious extension to manipulate
the display of a web page and deceive users into believing
something false. The change of the web page content may
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be subtle, but when it is combined with social engineering
techniques, it can cause significant harm to user security [9].
In Sect. 2, we will demonstrate two attacks on real-world
banking websites (HSBC and Barclays) to show how a mali-
cious extension may stealthily steal money from the user’s
bank account by making small modifications to the DOM
structure of an online banking web page.
Existing solutions to prevent malicious extensions gener-
ally involve changing the browser’s internal design [6,24,27],
strengthening the vetting process of repositories [4,11,13–
15], asking users to install yet another (trusted) extension
that detects malicious behaviour of other extensions [16,17]
or requiring an external hardware device (e.g. Cronto) that
performs out-of-band transaction verification.
Our solution In this paper, we propose a cryptographic
protocol that we call DOMtegrity to ensure the integrity of the
DOM structure of a web page delivered from a web server to
the rendering of the page at the client browser in the presence
of malicious extensions. Compared to previous solutions,
ours does not require changing the browser’s existing inter-
nal design; it does not need any external hardware device; it
is orthogonal to the strengthening of the vetting process; it
can be easily implemented by embedding in-line JavaScript
code in the web page rather than requiring the user to install
another (trusted) extension. The novelty of our solution lies
in exploiting subtle but important differences between exten-
sions and in-line scripts in terms of their rights to access
Websockets established between the server and the client.
This is combined with leveraging the latest Web Crypto API
that is recently added in all major browsers.
Contributions The main contributions of this paper are
summarized below:
– We propose DOMtegrity, a cryptographic protocol to pro-
tect end-to-end integrity of a web page’s DOM from the
point of delivery at a server to the final display in a client’s
browser. This is the first solution that works with the stan-
dard WebExtensions architecture without needing any
external hardware.
– We present an efficient implementation of DOMtegrity,
using JavaScript on the client side and Node.js on the
server side, and demonstrate that the proposed solution
is effective and only adds a small overhead to the com-
putation load and communication bandwidth.
– As part of the evaluation, we implement two attacks on
real-world online banking systems (HSBC and Barclays)
to show how a malicious extension can compromise the
security of the user’s bank account, and how DOMtegrity
can prevent such attacks as well as a whole range
of man-in-the-browser (MITB) [7] attacks that involve
maliciously changing the DOM structure of a web page.
2 Malicious extension attacks on online
banking
Attacks caused by malicious extensions are often known
as man-in-the-browser (MITB) attacks. To demonstrate the
importance of understanding the threats imposed by mali-
cious extensions in modern browsers, we show two proof-
of-concept attacks on real-world banking websites, HSBC
and Barclays, by exploiting the capability of browser exten-
sions to modify the DOM of a web page. The extensions are
developed for both Firefox and Chrome based on the standard
WebExtensions framework. In the proof-of-concept demon-
stration of the attacks, the money was transferred between
the authors’ accounts. All the experiments were approved by
Newcastle University’s ethics committee.
2.1 WebExtensions capabilities
Before describing the attacks, we should first explain WebEx-
tensions.1 The WebExtensions framework is a W3C stan-
dard cross-browser architecture [26] for developing browser
extensions using HTML, CSS and JavaScript. It is now sup-
ported in all major browsers except Safari.
An extension developed based on WebExtensions consists
of three components: the background page, the UI pages
and the content scripts. The background page is in charge
of long-term operations that last beyond the lifetime of a
particular browser window and is provided with access to
browser APIs. The UI pages put together the extension user
interface. Content scripts are JavaScript programs that are
run in the context of a web page and are allowed to interact
with the page.
Although the background and UI pages do not have access
to the DOM of the page, content scripts can modify the DOM.
Through content scripts, an extension can hide elements of
the DOM and insert another element in the same location
to effectively replace the original element. For example, a
text box can be placed by a malicious extension in place of
a password text box to capture a user’s password.
2.2 Attackmodel
In the rest of this paper, the attackers implement their threat
scenario through a malicious extension installed in the vic-
tim’s browser. Thus, the capabilities of a malicious extension
are limited to the context of a browser. We assume attack-
ers have not installed any operating system level malicious
software on the victim’s device to extend their capabilities
beyond the browser execution context.
In the following demonstration, we assume that a mali-
cious extension is already installed on a client’s browser.
1 https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/overview.
123
DOMtegrity: ensuring web page integrity against malicious browser extensions
This can be done through disguising malicious extensions as
legitimate browser extensions, using Trojans to install such
extensions, missing plug-in attacks or purchasing popular
extensions and then adding malicious code during updates
[9,23]. In both attacks, the web pages that are presented to
the victim are from the genuine banking websites via HTTPS.
We assume that the attacker has an account that they wish
to move funds to, and the details of this account are either
hard-coded into the browser extension or received in real
time from a remote Command & Control (C&C) centre [20].
The attacker’s bank account will eventually be exposed by
checking the victim’s bank transaction records. However, we
assume this is not any issue for the attacker since he only
needs to prevent the discovery of the fraud for some short
timescale in which the funds can be withdrawn from the
account.
2.3 HSBC attack
The first attack shows how a malicious extension can eas-
ily bypass the two-factor authentication that is adopted by
major banks, including HSBC. In this attack, the extension
intercepts the victim’s authentication credentials (i.e. login
details), sends them to a remote attacker and redirects the
user to a false maintenance page. Depending on the secu-
rity policy of the banking web site, this authentication could
involve a regular password and an additional one-time pass-
word (OTP) as a second factor which is either sent to the
user’s mobile phone as an SMS or locally generated using a
dedicated device (i.e. a Chip Authentication Program (CAP)
device) provided by the bank.
We developed a proof-of-concept attack that targets the
HSBC online banking web pages. To authenticate their
clients, HSBC uses a password-based user authentication
augmented with an OTP generated by a dedicated device, the
HSBC Physical Secure Key. Our attack works as follows:
1. When the victim requests the login page, the browser
extension content script replaces the username and pass-
word text boxes with its own and records the victim’s
username and password by communicating with the
extension background page.
2. When the victim is prompted for an OTP, the browser
extension records what the victim enters in a similar man-
ner.
3. The victim is then redirected to a genuine customer ser-
vice page. However, the content of the page is changed
on the fly by the extension content script to include
a message, indicating that the website is temporarily
unavailable for maintenance or due to technical difficul-
ties as shown in Fig. 1.
4. The stolen login credentials are sent to the attacker who
can then log into the victim’s online banking account.
Fig. 1 The HSBC customer service page modified by the malicious
extension to contain a message indicating website technical difficulties
We have implemented the attack by developing extensions
for both Firefox and Chrome based on WebExtensions. Our
extensions were able to perform the attack successfully with-
out being detected by the bank server. Consequently, we were
able to impersonate the victim and log into his or her bank
account on a separate machine.
2.4 Barclays attack
The second attack shows how a malicious extension can
defeat transaction-specific user authorization, which is added
by many banks such as Barclays as an extra layer of security
on top of two-factor authentication. Here, when an already
authenticated user requests a transaction, she is required to
provide a transaction-specific authorization code which is
either sent to the user out of band or generated by a dedicated
device upon unique transaction-specific input. This transac-
tion authentication is designed to prevent modification of
transaction data (e.g. recipient and amount) by man-in-the-
browser attackers.
Barclays uses the strongest form of transaction authen-
tication (the so-called full transaction authentication [1])
in which the unique transaction authorization code (i.e. the
transaction-specific OTP) is cryptographically bound to the
transaction data. The authorization code is calculated by
a dedicated device provided by Barclays called PINsentry.
Alternatively, the user can use the functionally equivalent
Mobile PINsentry application on her smartphone. PINsentry
is a battery-powered device consisting of a numeric keypad,
a small LCD screen, a card reader and a processor. When a
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transaction is requested through Internet banking, the user is
required to manually enter the transaction details, including
the payee account number and the amount, on PINsentry (or
Mobile PINsentry) and then enter the PINsentry produced
authorization code on the internet banking web page. How-
ever, in the following we show how a malicious extension can
defeat this security measure by combining social engineering
and DOM modifications. The attack works as follows:
1. When the victim requests a funds transfer, she is pre-
sented a form to provide the details of the funds transfer,
including the payee account number and the amount. The
malicious extension content script replaces the text box
where the victim is supposed to enter the account number
of the intended payee with its own text box and records
the entered account number by communicating with the
extension background page.
2. Then, the user is presented with a dialogue confirming
the transaction details and instructing her how to get
a transaction authorization code from PINsentry. The
instructions include asking the user to “Enter the payee’s
account number as your REF:” followed by the payee’s
account number. The malicious extension content script
replaces this instruction with “Enter this REF number:”
followed by the attacker’s account number, as shown in
Step 3 of the instructions in Fig. 2 with real bank details
suitably redacted.
3. A non-expert user, trusting the HTTPS page to be secure
and failing to notice the above subtle change, then enters
the attacker’s bank details in PINsentry and provides
a code authorizing the funds transfer to the attacker’s
account.
4. The browser extension changes the final confirmation
page before it is displayed to the user so that it shows
the account details of the original intended payee rather
than that of the attacker.
The key issue that we were able to exploit is that PINsentry
prompts the user for two pieces of transaction information:
“REF” and “Amount”. The only information about what
“REF” means is present on the website, which can be mod-
ified by the extension. We have responsibly disclosed our
attack to Barclays and since then Mobile PINsentry has been
updated and the prompt on the app has been fixed to explic-
itly ask the user for the payee’s account number instead of a
REF number.
3 Our proposed solution: DOMtegrity
In this section, we propose a solution, called DOMtegrity,
to address MITB attacks such as those demonstrated in
Fig. 2 The Barclays instructions page modified by the malicious
extension to include the attacker’s account number (redacted as
XXXXXXXX) as the REF number. The modified area is represented
in the green box (color figure online)
the previous section. Our solution is designed based on the
WebExtensions framework, which is now the standard exten-
sion development architecture recommended by W3C and
adopted by Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Edge
and Opera.
3.1 WebExtensions security model
The WebExtensions security model as implemented in mod-
ern browsers is based on the model proposed by Reis et al.
[22] who discussed the real-world security issues experi-
enced by Google Chrome and advocated a systematic method
to prevent these attacks. Here, we discuss parts of this model
that are necessary for the description of our protocol.
Browser zones In modern browsers, the execution envi-
ronment is divided into two zones: an unprivileged Internet
zone in which web pages are executed, and a privileged
Chrome zone in which extensions are executed. A schematic
representation of these zones is shown in Fig. 3. Scripts in the
Internet zone (i.e. the so-called in-line scripts within the web
page) cannot have access to the data in the Chrome zone (i.e.
the extension scripts), and vice versa. Therefore, although
the web page scripts and the extension content scripts can
interact with DOM separately, they cannot interact with each
other. This concept is called the isolated worlds principle
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Fig. 3 The Internet and Chrome zones of a modern browser and how
web pages, extensions and plug-ins interact [2]
[10]. The main reason for the isolation is to prevent mali-
cious in-line scripts from exploiting the vulnerabilities that
may exist in extension content scripts [2]. However, as we
will explain, the isolation is also useful in defending against
malicious extensions when the in-line scripts are from a legit-
imate source.
Permissions Every extension must provide a “manifest”
in the JSON format which defines the resources and the cor-
responding permissions for each component of the extension.
Based on this manifest, users are asked to grant the required
permissions at the time the extension is installed, and once
installed, the extension’s access to browser APIs is limited
to these permissions.
3.2 Design overview
DOMtegrity is designed to enable the server to detect any
unexpected modification of the DOM by extensions when the
web page is rendered in the browser. The underlying idea is
that DOMtegrity securely records all the modifications made
to the web page DOM until the final rendering of the page
and then securely communicates the recorded modifications
to the server. The server is then in a position to decide whether
or not the client’s browser has parsed the page as the server
expected.
DOMtegrity is implemented as a JavaScript program,
called pid.js, which is then embedded as an in-line script
(within a <script> tag) in the web page that the server
wishes to protect. This in-line inclusion is necessary since
extensions are not able to restrict the execution of in-line
web page scripts, whereas they can block loading external
script files. For the in-line JavaScript to work, we assume
that JavaScript execution is not disabled in the browser.
Since DOMtegrity is to record all modifications to the
DOM, it is essential that pid.js is placed at the start of
the page source code and before all other HTML tags. Since
parsing the web page in browser proceeds in the order that
tags are placed in the page source code, placing pid.js at
the start of the page ensures that recording changes in the
DOM starts immediately as the browser starts parsing the
page.
The isolated worlds principle guarantees that DOMtegrity’s
recording of modifications in DOM cannot be tampered with
by any extension. When executed, pid.js creates an on-
the-fly DOM property (also called a DOM expando) named
document.pid which implements the DOMtegrity func-
tions within a domain isolated from any extension.
DOMtegrity uses the recently introduced Websocket2
technology which provides a full-duplex communication
channel over TCP (or SSL/TLS for an encrypted channel) and
is now supported by all major browsers. In this paper, we only
consider Websocket established over the secure SSL/TLS
channels. The important property here is that although both
in-line scripts and extension content scripts can establish
Websockets, neither has access to Websockets established
by the other.
The extension’s inability to access Websocket communi-
cation established by DOMtegrity provides assurance on the
integrity of the communication between pid.js and the
server. The in-line script pid.js establishes a Websocket
with the server, and this Websocket is used as a secure chan-
nel to convey a secret key which is later used to authenticate
the DOM modifications that document.pid records. We
should emphasize that although an extension has extensive
access to HTTP(S) communications, it can only access the
Websockets that are established by the same extension.
Table 1 summarizes the relevant capabilities of extensions
compared with in-line scripts such as pid.js based on the
latest W3C specification (dated 23 July 2017) [26]. Both
can access the DOM and establish Websockets, but neither
can block Websocket communications. The extension cannot
access the expando created by pid.js. Neither pid.js
nor the extension can access or close Websockets established
by the other.
3.3 Detailed description
DOMtegrity runs in three stages: initialization, recording and
verification. The initialization stage sets up the protocol, the
recording stage is in charge of storing all DOM modifications,
and eventually in the verification stage evidence of DOM
integrity is generated on the client side and is sent to the
server for verification. These stages are described in detail in
the following. A sequence diagram of the protocol is shown
2 https://www.w3.org/TR/Websockets.
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Table 1 Capabilities of
extension and in-line script
(W3C [26])
Capability Extension pid.js
Access the DOM ✓ ✓
Establish websockets ✓ ✓
Block websocket establishment ✗ ✗
Block websocket communications ✗ ✗
Access an expando created by pid.js ✗ ✓
Access/close websockets established by pid.js ✗ ✓
Access/close websockets established by the extension ✓ ✗
Serverpid.js
 Define DOM Expando
If Duplicate Request Received
Return REJECT
Establish WebSocket
Generate Random Key k
 Generate Page ID: PID
k(PID)
If Duplicate Request Received
Return REJECT
Retrieve Expected Page ID: PID’
If HMACk(PID’) Does Not Match A
Return REJECT
Return SUCCESS
Open WebSocket And Request Key
Send Key And Close WebSocket
Recording
Send Decision
Fig. 4 Sequence diagram for DOMtegrity
in Fig. 4. We assume the web page is served over HTTPS.
The client is identified by the TLS session ID.
Stage 1: Initialization
This stage begins as the browser starts parsing the web page.
In this stage, the required setup for DOMtegrity is carried out
as follows:
Open websocket and request key First, pid.js sends a
request to open a Websocket in order to receive an HMAC key
from the server. The server caters for such a request only once
within an HTTPS session. To cater for the request, the server
establishes a Websocket channel with the client, and through
this channel sends a random 256-bit key k. The Websocket
is subsequently closed, and the rest of the communication
is continued over HTTPS. Any further requests for a key in
the same HTTPS session are refused by the server. If the
server receives more than one request for the client, it is an
indication that a malicious extension tries to impersonate the
client.
Define mutation observer The next step is to assign a
mutation observer3 to the document class. Mutation observer
is a JavaScript global API that provides developers a way to
react to DOM modifications. It records all the changes in
the DOM tree, including the alternations in attributes. This
covers every possible DOM modification with the exception
of the changes in the way events are handled in DOM. We
discuss how to deal with this exception below.
Stop event propagation In this step, pid.js stops
assignment of new events to DOM elements by calling
the stopImmediatePropagation method4 for all ele-
ments. Note that (in DOM Level 2 and above) existing
assigned events cannot be changed or removed unless the
browser is presented with the reference to the registered
event, and the isolated worlds principle ensures that exten-
sions do not have access to such references.
Define DOM expando Next, the script adds an expando
(i.e. an on-the-fly property) to the document node of
the DOM, as shown in Fig. 5. This property is called
document.pid. As a property, it does not change the
DOM node structure and hence is not visible to exten-
sion content scripts due to the isolated worlds princi-
ple. document.pid is implemented as an object with
encapsulated functions. All document.pid functions are
3 https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/API/MutationObserver.
4 https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/API/Event/
stopImmediatePropagation.
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Fig. 5 An overview of document.pid and the inability of extensions to
modify this region of DOM
private (using so-called “closures”5) except for one (i.e.
document.pid.request()) which we discuss later.
Stage 2: Recording
After initialization, DOMtegrity enters a persistent passive
mode and records all DOM mutations through the muta-
tion observer. The recorded mutations include adding or
removing child elements to a node, inserting or changing
an attribute in a node, or modifying the data of a DOM node.
The recording continues until the user’s interaction with the
web page finishes and the filled form is to be posted to the
server.
Stage 3: Verification
In this stage, a page identifier (PID) containing the recorded
changes in the DOM is generated. The stage starts when the
function document.pid.request() is called. This is
the only public expando function and should be called when
the client “returns” the form, e.g. by clicking a “submit”
button. This stage uses Web Crypto API,6 a relatively new
JavaScript capability to perform cryptographic operations in
browser.
Generate Page ID The first step is to generate the
PID which consists of two parts: the list of recorded
DOM mutations throughout the recording stage, and the
source code of the page at the time the verification stage
starts. According to the W3C standard, there are seven
mutations observable. Each possible DOM mutation is
encoded into a unique digit to achieve a short representa-
tion of the list. The source code (accessible to JavaScript
5 https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/JavaScript/Closures.
6 www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI.
via the document.documentElement.innerHTML
attribute) represents the final state of the DOM elements in
the page. Here, we consider the protection of integrity for the
whole page, but it is possible to define a custom PID to cover
only part of the page.
Compute assertion Next, a message authentication code
(MAC) on the generated PID is produced in the browser using
the secret key k. We opted to use HMAC with the SHA-
256 hash function as our MAC. This selection is based on
two main reasons: first, the 128 bit security of the HMAC-
SHA256 is adequate for nearly all practical web applications;
second, the HMAC function is supported consistently in all
modern browsers. The computed HMAC tag is sent to the
server for verification as an assertion.
Verify assertion On the server side, upon receiving the
assertion, the server first checks if more than one request for
fetching the HMAC key has been received earlier within the
HTTPS session, and rejects the assertion if that is the case.
Multiple key fetching requests indicate man-in-the-browser
impersonation attacks. If only one request has been received,
the server retrieves the expected PID, computes the HMAC of
the expected PID and compares it with the received assertion.
Normally, there is no need for the client to send the PID. The
server expects no changes in the DOM other than those made
by the web page scripts. Hence, the server has a specific
expectation of the recorded DOM mutations and the final
source code of the page, and therefore a known expected PID.
The server accepts the assertion on the integrity of the page if
the HMAC verification succeeds. Depending on the decision,
the server proceeds to provide or refuse further service to the
client. In case of refusal, the server may additionally send an
error message through an out-of-band channel, e.g. an SMS
message to the user’s mobile phone.
In the protocol described above, we assume the legitimate
changes of DOM can be pre-determined; hence, the server is
able to derive an expected PID. In this case, the client does
not need to send the actual modifications to the server. The
server can verify the HMAC tag against an expected PID to
decide acceptance or rejection. However, in some cases the
changes of DOM may not be fixed (e.g. they may depend on
user interactions). To address this, we only need to slightly
modify the protocol by sending PID along with the assertion
to the server. This way, the server can first verify the HMAC
tag against the received PID, and then examine the changes
recorded in the PID according to some rules to determine if
they are legitimate or not.
Choosing HMAC versus hash
DOMtegrity uses the Websocket to securely transport a key
which is later used in the generation of the HMAC tag. The
Websocket channel only lasts for the duration of the key
transport and is immediately closed by the server once it
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sends the key. An alternative approach would be to keep the
Websocket open for the duration of the protocol, and instead
of sending an HMAC of the PID, the client can securely send
a hash (say SHA-256) of the PID through the Websocket. We
chose the HMAC approach to minimize the cost of commu-
nication since maintaining a full-duplex Websocket requires
exchanges of ping-pong messages to keep the channel alive.
By using HMAC, DOMtegrity minimizes the duration of a
Websocket only for the essential purpose of transporting a
short (32 bytes) key. As we will show, the computation of
HMAC based on WebCryptoAPI incurs a negligible cost in
the client browser. The computed HMAC tag can be sent
through an XHR request over HTTPS.
3.4 HowDOMtegrity prevents attacks
In this section, we review a number of design choices in
DOMtegrity that are essential to effectively defend against
DOM manipulation attacks by malicious extensions.
Influencing the execution of pid.js A malicious exten-
sion may try to influence the execution of pid.js through
the content scripts or the injected scripts. First of all, it cannot
stop or change pid.js functions through its content scripts.
Due to the isolated worlds principle, and that DOMtegrity
procedures are defined as document.pid expando func-
tions, the extension content scripts cannot block or manip-
ulate these procedures. Furthermore, a malicious extension
cannot stop or change pid.js functions through injection
of scripts into the page. Injected scripts do not have access to
thepid.jsWebsocket due to closure. The only interference
that injected scripts can cause with DOMtegrity is to call the
public function document.pid.request(). However,
this will result in the rejection of the integrity assertion since
the inject script changes DOM by adding a new <script>
tag.
Polluting JavaScript variables A malicious extension
may inject malicious scripts into the page, trying to pol-
lute the local and global variables used by pid.js. First,
because we leverage JavaScript closure to make a protected
reference to Websocket, an injected malicious script cannot
access the local Websocket variable in pid.js. Second,
an injected script cannot prevent Websocket establishment
by DOMtegrity through redefining global JavaScript APIs (a
process known as “monkey patching”). The isolated worlds
principle prevents extensions from modifying parameters of
a page’s global environment through content scripts. Hence,
the only avenue to modify such global definitions would be
injecting scripts into the page. There are two cases here. In
the first case, the malicious extension ensures the injected
script runs before pid.js (which can be realized by setting
run_at to document_start in the manifest). However,
at document_start which refers to the time before the
DOM is created by the browser engine, there is no DOM
for the injected script to insert a <script> object, as a
result there is no influence on the parsing of pid.js. In the
second case, when the injected script runs after pid.js,
DOMtegrity’s objects have already been created based on
default (clean) variable definitions. In the implementation
of pid.js, we leverage the Object.freeze() [12]
function to freeze the DOMtegrity APIs in the initialization
phase, hence making the DOMtegrity object immutable. This
prevents an injected malicious script from performing any
modifications to the global variables used in pid.js after
it is parsed.
Eavesdropping the secure channel The pid.js Web-
socket provides a secure communication channel between
pid.js and the server. This channel is inaccessible to the
malicious extension [5]. In other words, the extension cannot
read or modify data sent through this channel.
Impersonation The design of DOMtegrity was based on
the W3C standard on “browser extensions” [26]. A malicious
extension may try to impersonate pid.js by sending a request
to establish the Websocket first. However, according to the
W3C specification [26], an extension is not allowed to stop
pid.js from sending its own Websocket request. The set-
ting of document_start in the manifest of the extension
can enforce the execution of content scripts before parsing the
loading page. However, a meaningful attack would need the
user to interact with a web page that is loaded in the browser
(e.g. to fill in a form or to click a button). The inclusion of
pid.js before the web page HTML code ensures that the
user interaction can only happen after pid.js sends its own
Websocket establishment request. Hence, any attempt for an
impersonation attack by the malicious extension is detected
at the server side as a result of observing multiple Websocket
establishment requests.
4 Implementation and evaluation
In this section, we describe how we implemented a number of
proof-of-concept malicious extensions to test our solution in
several attack scenarios and provide performance measure-
ments.
On the client side, DOMtegrity is implemented as a sin-
gle JavaScript program which is integrated in-line within a
<script> tag in the beginning of a web page. On the server
side, we implemented the server using Node.js version 4.4.0.
All cryptographic operations in pid.js are programmed as
asynchronous operations using JavaScript Promise objects.7
7 https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/
Global_Objects/Promise.
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4.1 Confirming DOMtegrity effectiveness
Detecting online banking attacks To confirm that our
implementation of DOMtegrity can detect the attacks we
discussed in Sect. 2, we implemented copies of the online
banking web pages for both systems on our local server and
embedded pid.js in-line. Then, we re-ran the attacks by
the malicious extensions we developed on Chrome and Fire-
fox. In both cases, the server was able to successfully detect
the malicious modifications made on the web pages and block
further requests from the client.
Detecting other possible DOM modifications To con-
firm that our implementation of DOMtegrity can detect
other possible DOM modifications, we considered a com-
prehensive list of changes extensions can make to DOM and
developed extensions that make such changes through con-
tent scripts. These changes include:
1. insert a new DOM element into the tree;
2. remove a targeted DOM element from the tree;
3. hide a targeted DOM element and replace it with its own
element (possibly of an identical type) with a different
ID;
4. change the style of a targeted DOM element; and
5. embed another script file which in turn changes an
attribute of a targeted DOM element.
We developed five extensions (based on WebExtensions),
each making one of the above modifications. All these exten-
sions are tested on a simple login web page, which contains
username and password text boxes and a “Sign in” button,
withpid.js embedded in-line. We tested each of our exten-
sions on Chrome and Firefox. As we expected, in all the
experiments our server was able to detect the malicious DOM
modifications on the client side.
4.2 Performance evaluations
On the client side, the web page is run in Firefox v50.1
and Chrome v54 on a machine equipped with Intel Core
i7 2.8 GHz with 8 GB of RAM and Windows 7 Enterprise.
The server is set up on a machine with Windows 8.1 × 64
Enterprise Edition equipped with Intel Core i5 2.3 GHz with
8 GB of RAM.
File size The client-side JavaScript is 550 lines of code and
adds 21.6 KB in the normal mode and 6.33 KB in the minified
mode to the original web page source code. Our simple login
page, the HSBC web page and the Barclays web page are
31.5 KB, 2.1 MB and 3.6 MB, respectively. The overhead of
the DOMtegrity client source code is relatively small com-
pared to those of other popular JavaScript frameworks. For
example, the popular JQuery framework8 adds 84.6 KB to
the web page in the minified mode. The server side Node.js
implementation is 240 lines of code with a size of 4.25 KB.
Computation load The computation load of the initial-
ization stage is proportional to the number of elements in the
web page since the browser needs to stop event registration
for every node of the DOM. We measured the time it takes for
this step to complete for our own login page and for the com-
paratively richer HSBC and Barclays online banking pages.
For each page, we ran the experiment 100 times and we report
the average here. For our login page, this step took 15.64 ms
on Firefox and 16.53 ms on Chrome to complete, resulting
in an average of 0.71 to 0.75 ms per DOM element. For the
Barclays page, the richest page, this step took 624.76 ms on
Firefox and 839.83 ms on Chrome to complete, resulting in
an average of 0.49 to 0.65 ms per DOM element. Further
details are reported in Table 2.
The recording stage only stores an encoding of the DOM
change for every DOM modification and incurs a negligible
computational overhead. In our experiments, the latency for
recording each mutation is 0.005 ms.
The verification stage requires the calculation of PID and
HMAC tag. In our measurements, the average elapsed time
for computation of PID is 1.97 ms in Chrome and Opera, and
2.79 ms in Firefox, and the average elapsed time for com-
puting the HMAC tag is 2.63 ms in Chrome and Opera, and
2.68 ms in Firefox. The box plots of elapsed times for 100
executions in Firefox and Chrome are illustrated in Fig. 6.
All values are rounded up to the closest 0.01 ms.
Computations on the server side are very efficient. The
most time consuming step on the server side is retrieving
PID from storage which takes 1.96 ms on average. It takes
0.17 ms to compute a HMAC tag and another 0.03 ms to
compare the tag against the received. The average elapsed
time for 100 executions of each step on the server side is
shown in Table 3. All values are rounded up to the closest
0.01 ms.
Communication bandwidth DOMtegrity is designed to
be efficient in terms of required communication bandwidth.
The key and the MAC tag are only 32 bytes each, amounting
to a negligible fraction of the usual data transmission between
the client and the server. The embedded JavaScript code is
relatively compact (21.6 KB in the normal and 6.33 KB in
the minified mode), as compared to other popular JavaScript
frameworks such as JQuery (84.6 KB in the minified mode).
The establishment of the Websocket is also efficient as the
underlying technology is designed to be lightweight. By the
design of DOMtegrity, the duration of the Websocket channel
is kept to the minimum only for the essential purpose of
transporting the HMAC key.
8 https://jquery.com.
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Table 2 Average elapsed times
for stopping event propagation
in Chrome and Firefox for our
experimental web pages
#Elements Total time (ms) Time/element (ms)
Chrome Firefox Chrome Firefox
Simple login page 22 16.53 15.64 0.75 0.71
Simulated HSBC page 987 713.68 485.08 0.72 0.49
Simulated Barclays page 1283 839.83 624.76 0.65 0.49
Fig. 6 Box plots of elapsed times for PID and HMAC calculations in
100 executions in Chrome and Firefox
Table 3 Average and standard deviation of the elapsed times on the
server side for 100 executions of each step of the protocol
Step Average time (ms) STD (ms)
Key generation 0.02 0.02
PID retrieval 1.96 1.59
HMAC calculation 0.17 0.01
Decision 0.03 0.02
4.3 Compatibility with real-world extensions
DOMtegrity is designed to detect all DOM changes. In
the simplest case, when the server is able to anticipate all
DOM changes, pid.js only needs to send back a short
HMAC tag, which the server can verify against the antic-
ipated changes. However, this may not work with existing
real-world extensions that work by modifying the DOM.
Examples of such extensions include Grammarly (a pop-
ular grammar and spell checker) and LastPass (a popular
password manager). In this section, we investigate the com-
patibility of DOMtegrity with real-world extensions.
Real-world extension set For this experiment, we have
downloaded a large set of extensions from the Chrome Web
Store and the official Mozilla Add-on repositories. Over-
all, we investigated more than 14,000 WebExtensions-based
extensions in the two repositories, as follows:
– all extensions from Chrome’s Starter Kit list,
– all extensions from Chrome’s Editor Picks list,
– all extensions returned with the search keyword “block”,
– all extensions returned with the search keyword “blocker”,
– all extensions with more than 100 active users in each
Chrome Web Store extension category, and
– all WebExtension-based add-ons in Mozilla’s top 1000
most popular extensions (57 extensions).
We installed each extension in a mint instance of the
browser, and then, we requested a DOMtegrity-protected web
page, i.e. a page in which the pid.js script was embedded.
When the page was completely loaded in the browser, we
recorded the generated PID in the presence of the extension
on the client side, plus the assertion verification result on the
server side.
Results We compared the generated PID on the client side
with the expected PID on the server side for each rejected
extension in order to investigate the type of modification
they applied. The W3C specification on DOM categorizes
page mutations into three groups: attributes, characterData
and childList [25]. The attributes category includes mutations
involving modifications of attributes of existing nodes. Char-
acterData refers to mutations that change any data between
the opening and closing tags of a text node. Finally, ChildList
includes mutations that involve insertion or removal of nodes
in the DOM tree. We investigated the generated PID on the
client side and classified the rejected extensions into the
above categories. A rejection by the server may be caused
by a mixture of the mutation types. In that case, the PID
records every type of the mutations.
Overall, 15% of the extensions caused rejection of the
assertion. In other words, 15% the extensions we collected
from the web store modified the DOM. Among the 15%
rejections, 86% of them involved attribute mutations, 2%
characterData mutations and 98% childList mutations. If we
simply record every mutation caused by the extension in
the PID, the percentage of occurrence for each of mutations
types for attribute, characterData and childList mutations was
43.9%, 0.2% and 55.9%, respectively. It would be interesting
to investigate whether the DOM modification made by the
15% extensions contains any malicious intent (which we plan
to do in future research). Normally, Google quickly removes
extensions from the Chrome web store as soon as they are
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(a)
(c) (d)
(b)
Fig. 7 Examples of source code modifications during parsing in browsers. Note that modifications observed in Firefox a do not apply to Chrome,
and modifications in Chrome b do not apply to Firefox
reported to contain malicious code. In the latest example, a
malicious Chrome extension, called Droidclub, was removed
by Google in February 2018 (along with 88 other malicious
extensions) [8], after it had affected half a million users.
Droidclub works by injecting a malicious script; hence, it
falls within the category of childList mutations. Note that
our attacks on online banking systems lie in the Character-
Data category since the extension changed the fields within
a text node.
Possible mitigations One possible mitigation strategy to
accommodate existing extensions is to consider a more flexi-
ble policy on DOM modifications. This will require pid.js
to send the PID to the server along with the assertion. The
PID consists of the recorded mutations and the final source
code. The server can then check the PID against a set of
policies to decide if the mutations are acceptable. Thus, fur-
ther compatibility can be gained by the client sending more
data (i.e. the PID) and the server performing slightly more
complex verification.
The above solution also works with dynamic web pages
where the DOM modifications depend on how the user inter-
acts with the web page. Such interactions cannot always be
anticipated by the server, but can still be checked by the server
against rules later once a record of the DOM modifications
is obtained.
5 Further discussion
Browser Parsing Inconsistencies. During the testing of our
protocol, we observed two unexpected and undocumented
DOM changes made by the browsers in Fig. 7. These changes
are caught by DOMtegrity because they modify the source
code of the web page. These modifications do not alter the
content of the page, but they change the DOM structure.
Such changes are harmless from a security perspective, but
they are unnecessary and inconsistent between browsers. We
reported these minor issues to W3C and Google, and were
advised that these appeared to be implementation bugs in
the browsers and should be fixed in future releases. This
finding shows that although DOMtegrity is designed to detect
malicious tempering of DOM, it is also useful to uncover
browser implementation bugs.
Dynamic web pages A dynamic web page is one with
variable content depending on the user or her actions. This
is done by either server-side or client-side scripting, or a
mixture of both.
If only server-side scripting is used, a web page is con-
structed on the server side at the time of request and
transmitted to the client. No further changes to the DOM
are expected in this case. Hence, such pages can be protected
using DOMtegrity as it is designed.
If client-side scripting is used, the dynamic web page
DOM is modified in browser based on the user’s interac-
tions with the page. In this case, there would be no way for
the server to predict user’s interactions with the page, and
hence, it would be necessary for pid.js to send the PID
along with the HMAC tag to the server so that a decision on
the integrity of the page can be made based on the server’s
policies.
Private mode Extension availability policies in private
mode are different across browsers. Firefox permits exten-
sions to function in private mode. In contrast, Chrome dis-
ables the extensions by default in its private mode (incognito).
In each case, DOMtegrity functions as normal, regardless if
the extensions are enabled in the client browser.
Enabling JavaScript Our solution requires that JavaScript
is enabled in the user browser. Obviously, it will not work if
JavaScript is disabled (e.g. manually by the user, or by setting
the CSP response header). In fact, when JavaScript is disabled
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in the browser, any web page with embedded JavaScript code
will stop working. In practice, there are standard techniques
to detect if JavaScript is enabled in the browser, and deliver
JavaScript-rich content only when it is enabled. The same
techniques would apply to DOMtegrity.
Confidentiality of data DOMtegrity is designed to pro-
tect the integrity of the DOM structure as it is rendered in the
browser, but it cannot guarantee the confidentiality of data. A
malicious extension is able to read the content of DOM ele-
ments as well as http(s) traffic data (and may send the stolen
credentials to an external party). This is a privileged capabil-
ity explicitly permitted by the browser, which treats a browser
extension as a “trusted” part of the browser [26]. While our
work presents a way to address the integrity problem caused
by malicious extensions, we leave it to the future work to
address the confidentiality problem, which may require fun-
damental changes in the browser architectural design.
6 Related work
This section reviews related work on countering the threats
imposed by malicious browser extensions. Existing coun-
termeasures can be categorized into four types: modify-
ing browsers, strengthening the vetting process, requiring
another trusted extension and using external hardware.
Modifying browsers Proposals in this category require
their system to be integrated natively within the browser.
Ter Louw et al. design systems for protecting code integrity
and user data [24]. The latter is a mechanism that augments
the browser to support policy-based run-time monitoring of
extension behaviour. The goal is to protect sensitive user data
from being accessed or modified by the extension. Dhawan
et al. proposed “Sabre”, an in-browser information-flow
monitor to detect malicious activities of JavaScript-based
extensions during run-time [6]. Sabre associates an appro-
priate label to all in-memory JavaScript objects based on
whether they carry sensitive information. Then, it monitors
the objects carrying sensitive information for any insecure
access. Wang et al. proposed an extension access control
framework [27], which dynamically analyses the behaviour
of extensions at run-time and controls policies to restrict
their access to resources. All the proposals in this category
require modification of browser code base. Unfortunately,
none of these proposals have been adopted by mainstream
browsers so far. In fact, some of these proposals are based on
the XPCOM model for creating extensions in Firefox which
is due to be deprecated in favour of WebExtensions.
Strengthening the vetting process Proposals in this cat-
egory involve various techniques to improve detection rates
of malicious extensions during the vetting process. Jagpal
et al. shared their three years of experience in fighting with
malicious browser extensions in Chrome Web Store [13].
They developed a detection system called WebEval to vet
the extensions in the market. WebEval combines both static
and dynamic analysis of the source code, as well as tak-
ing into consideration of the reputation of the extension’s
developer, and involving human experts in manual reviews
whenever necessary. Their method was able to identify real-
world malicious extensions with a success rate of 96.5%.
Besides methods adopted by the industry, academic
researchers also propose various techniques to strengthen
the vetting process. Kashyap et al. proposed a framework to
automate the vetting process in official extension repositories
[15]. They proposed a notion of add-on security signature
which provides detailed information on its data flow and
API usages. Kapravelos et al. presented Hulk as a dynamic
analysis system to detect malicious extensions [14]. They
monitored the execution and network activities of extensions
to detect their malicious intentions. The had an extensive
collection of real-world extensions from Chrome Web Store,
and one of their findings was discovering a malicious exten-
sion that affected 5.5 million users. Guha et al. proposed
an IBEX framework for authoring, analysing, verifying and
deploying secure browser extensions [11]. They suggested
a high level programming language to develop extensions.
They also proposed Datalog to specify fine-grained access
control to restrict the extension’s access to security-specific
web content. Bandhakavi et al. presented the VEX framework
for highlighting potential security vulnerabilities in browser
extension [4]. They applied static information-flow analysis
to catch malicious JavaScript code in the extension imple-
mentation.
Requiring another trusted extension Proposals in this
category require users to trust one particular extension and
install it consciously. Marouf et al. proposed a run-time
framework called REM that monitors the access made by
extensions and provides customized permission [17]. They
developed an extension for monitoring other extension based
on REM. They monitored API calls from an extension to
the browser and enforced their policies on the extension.
They notified users about the latest activities of other exten-
sions and allowed them to block future such activities. Liu
et al. demonstrated the same threat in Chrome [16]. They
also implemented an extension to enforce more fine-grained
privileges to extensions in Chrome. They proposed HTML
elements to use another attribute called “sensitivity” to dif-
ferentiate DOM elements and enforce the policy that they
call micro-privilege management.
Using external hardware Cronto9 is a commercial
hardware-based solution to address MITB attacks specif-
ically for online banking. It was initially developed by a
spin-off company from the University of Cambridge in 2005
9 https://www.vasco.com/products/two-factor-authenticators/
crontosign.html.
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and was later acquired by VASCO Data Security Inter-
national for £17m in 2013. The product has been widely
deployed by major banks in Chile, Switzerland and Ger-
many to secure online banking. The Cronto solution works
by using a special client device, which shares a secret key
with the sever. When the user performs transactions during
online banking, the server sends a 2-D barcode to display
on the client’s web page, which encodes the encrypted trans-
action details such as the amount, timestamp and account
number. The 2-D barcode is then read and verified by the
Cronto device that has the decryption key. Upon successful
verification, Cronto generates a one-time password (OTP),
which the user can enter in the browser to authenticate the
transaction. Here, the Cronto device can be either custom-
built hardware with an embedded camera or a smart phone.
DOMtegrity is similar to Cronto in preventing malicious
modifications on the client side against MITB attacks. How-
ever, ours is a JavaScript-based software solution and does
not require an external hardware token. We note that although
the main design aim of Cronto is to ensure the integrity of
transactions, it has a secondary function as a second factor
for authentication since the device has a shared secret key
with the server. DOMtegrity does not have this function, but
it can be used in combination with any existing two-factor
authentication scheme, e.g. the Chip Authentication Program
(CAP) currently used by HSBC and Barclays.
Other related work Reis et al. proposed the idea of ensur-
ing web content integrity by JavaScript [21]. Their method
was inspired by the Linux integrity check and AEGIS [3].
The authors developed a client-side JavaScript framework
named TripWire, which detects unexpected modifications
done by ISPs and other intermediate nodes over HTTP com-
munication. Once the page rendering is complete, the code
requested the page’s source code from the server through
AJAX requests, then the internal source code is compared
with the server’s one at the client side. Tripwire did not
consider browser extensions in their attack model because it
considers them as “trusted”. They discussed that their method
was comparable to HTTPS with better performance. Patil
[19] proposed another method to isolate DOM from con-
tent script. They used shadow DOM to present an encrypted
view of the page data to the content script. They developed
a proof-of-concept prototype in their research.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we present DOMtegrity, a JavaScript-based
solution to provide end-to-end protection of integrity for web
content from the point of delivery at a sever to the final render-
ing in a client’s browser. Our solution works with the standard
WebExtensions framework and does not require modifying
existing architectures of web browsers, nor using any external
hardware device. As part of the evaluation, we implement two
attacks on real-world online banking websites: HBSC and
Barclays, to demonstrate how malicious extensions can com-
promise the online banking security, and how DOMtegrity
can effectively prevent such attacks as well as other man-in-
the-browser attacks caused by malicious extensions. We run
an extensive study of the top 14,000 extensions to investi-
gate the prevalence and types of DOM changes. Our study
confirms that DOMtegrity is compatible with the vast major-
ity of widely used extensions and can be made compatible
with other extensions after small modifications. We present
detailed timing measurements to show that DOMtegrity is
efficient and adds only a relatively small overhead to the per-
formance on both the client and the server sides.
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